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Abstract:  The current and future security environments will require the 
United States to have versatile military forces able to operate throughout 
the spectrum of conflict.  Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) were 
created to provide this versatility.  In order to have the strategic impact for 
which ARSOF was created, these forces must be remissioned from the 
tactical tasks which currently consume their availability, returned to the 
core competencies for which they were founded, and adapt their 
bureaucratic structure to maximize their strategic potential.  This change 
will occur in a time of limited budgets and within the constant struggle of 
parochialism within and among the services.  Through the Phase 0 
operations for which ARSOF was tailored, they will provide policy makers 
with the capability to prevent future decisive engagements and maintain 
the US as a global power.  
 
“A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change 
and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision 
and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant 
and useful members of the joint team.”  
--General Peter J. Schoomaker, USAi
 
 
 History informs our present and provides insight to our future and the 
future appears bright for US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). 
Throughout ARSOF’s history, the roles and missions of Civil Affairs (CA), Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO), and Special Forces (SF) have expanded 
and contracted dependent upon the political climate and the security 
environment.  This paper proposes that these ARSOF units should return to their 
core competencies in order to meet the present threat, while the future security 
environment will demand these same capabilities under a different organizational 
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structure.  A growing body of literature from the military and academia suggests 
future US conflicts will trend toward irregular and unconventional threats, so the 
capabilities of Army Special Operations Forces seem destined for prominence in 
the Department of Defense.  However, as GEN Schoomaker suggests in the 
quote above, ARSOF is not immune to the need to transform to remain relevant.  
ARSOF leaders must quickly translate current policy into tangible operational 
capability, while simultaneously keeping an eye on the future.  This innovation 
must take place over the next two decades, in a time of continuing conflict, 
budgetary restrictions, and a globalizing international system.  If transformed 
properly, ARSOF will provide national leaders with a unique range of capabilities 
in defense, diplomacy, and development which are suited to the threats of the 
future.  This paper uses the term ARSOF to refer specifically to Army Civil 
Affairs, Military Information Support Operations, and Special Forces for the sake 
of brevity, realizing that Army Special Operations Forces also include other units 
such as Army Rangers and Special Operations Aviation.ii
 
   
 The current units that comprise the US Army Special Operations Forces 
originated in World War II.  Civil Affairs units were first established early in the 
war to bridge the military-political gap found when governing occupied 
countries.
ARSOF Beginnings  
iii  The larger Army was uncomfortable with this idea, as governance 
was not perceived as a military function.  Immediately following V-E Day, 
President Truman announced that civil administration of occupied territories 
would transfer from the War Department to the State Department.  There was a 
consensus that this was the right course of action, but the State Department 
lacked the resources to effectively administer the areas.  So, despite 
concurrence on the ideal situation, the War Department continued to conduct 
civilian administration.iv
 Psychological Operations had an equally rocky beginning in World War II, 
with psychological warfare capabilities shuffled from the Army to the Office of 
  This case proved to be a harbinger of things to come. 
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Strategic Services (OSS) and back again.  Psychological activities were seen by 
military leadership as dishonorable and inherently ‘un-military.’v  Although used 
extensively in World War II, military leadership was quick to disband 
psychological warfare capabilities following the war’s conclusion.  Fortunately, 
then-President Eisenhower recognized the value of psychological operations 
from his experience as the Allied Commander and sponsored its re-
establishment as an effective tool in the fight against Communism.vi
 As with psychological operations, the confluence of the existential threat of 
Communism and the power of an influential sponsor, explains the establishment 
of Special Forces.  A former OSS member, Aaron Bank, saw the need for a 
military unit that could, “develop, support; organize, train, or exploit indigenous 
guerilla”
 
vii forces within enemy territory.  Originally, created within the 
Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Special Forces units 
were staffed by former OSS members and European émigrés.viii
 In the years since the creation of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations 
(now MISO), and Special Forces, these specialized units have seen a constant 
cycle of growth and contraction in size, missions, and acceptance within the 
Army.  The number of personnel and level of prominence within the military seem 
to be indirectly proportional to the number of missions ARSOF claims to be able 
to conduct at any period of time.  During the conflict in Vietnam, when Special 
Forces was at the zenith of its personnel strength, SF units conducted indirect 
‘by, with, and through’ operations and clandestine strikes, while their General 
Purpose Force (GPF) counterparts conducted extensive advisory missions with 
the South Vietnamese Army.  In the years after Vietnam, ARSOF was drawn 
down in size and argued for a broader range of missions, until the operations in 
Somalia.  During the late 1990’s, another era of grasping for a concrete role, 
ARSOF again expanded its mission set, until it was called to complete the 
purpose for which it was created in Afghanistan.
 
ix  Throughout its history, ARSOF 
is in a continuing struggle for acceptance in the Army.  At other times, ARSOF is 
its own worst enemy, as it deviates from its core competencies in search of tasks 
to remain relevant.  The last nine years of conflict have seen ARSOF reduced to 
2011 Special Operations Essays 
4   
 
tactical support of GPF in contrast to having the strategic impact for which it was 
organized, trained, and equipped.  For example, Army Special Forces, after 
leading the classic unconventional warfare overthrow of the Taliban regime, 
transitioned to a direct-action tactical method in support of GPF.  Civil Affairs 
units working either with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or independently, are 
finding themselves—as they did in post-WWII Europe—trying to hand over 
governance and stability operations to US government agencies that do not have 
the capacity to conduct them.  Military Information Support Operators are 
enmeshed in supporting the GPF population-centric COIN campaign.  While 
there are key supporting roles that ARSOF should fill in Iraq and Afghanistan—
training of Afghan Commandos and Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Forces, as well as 
MISO operations in support of COIN—there is an opportunity cost associated 
with the large amount of ARSOF personnel that these missions currently occupy.  
That cost is felt in places where ARSOF should, and would traditionally, be 
conducting the operations for which they were formed.  The following analysis 
uses the above history, coupled with the scope provided by ARSOF capstone 
documents and national security policy statements, to propose a roadmap for 
immediate and long-term change.   
 
 In its recent history of expanding and contracting core missions and roles, 
ARSOF has done itself a disservice in not firmly establishing its roles and 
limitations.  However, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may provide an 
excellent backdrop for the reestablishment of these standards.  The last seven 
years of both conflicts have shown the utility of ARSOF support to GPF 
operations.  With the GPF-supporting role of ARSOF displayed, now is the time 
to reestablish ARSOFs independent role in achieving strategic goals—the 
unconventional warfare and influence missions for which ARSOF was created.  
What makes ARSOF uniquely suited to conduct these missions is the training 
and organization of the personnel that includes regional specialization and 
The Near Future (5-10 Years) 
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language ability.  Ironically though, there currently exists a contradiction between 
the renewed ARSOF focus on language capability and its deployment of forces.  
For instance, 3rd Special Forces Group retains the primary responsibility for 
operations in Afghanistan, and the accompanying Theater Security Cooperation 
Plan (TSCP) training missions in the former soviet republics.  Yet, the personnel 
assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group are trained in French and Arabic 
languages, for use in Africa.  Meanwhile, 1st Battalion, 10th
 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) helps define the US 
defense strategy for the near-term future.  The QDR lists strategic priorities in the 
following order:  prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to 
defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve 
and enhance the all-volunteer force.
 Special Forces Group, 
with its core of Russian language-trained soldiers, is headquartered near 
USAFRICOM, and therefore is conducting training missions in Africa.  Although 
ARSOF purports to be refocusing on language capability, it is deploying French 
and Arabic-trained operators to Russian-speaking countries, and Russian-trained 
operators to Africa.  An immediate re-alignment of forces to their traditional AORs 
would truly place priority on language and regional specialty.  In addition, forces 
gained by the drawdown dividend—ARSOF personnel that are able to be 
repurposed from the current conflicts and applied towards more strategic goals—
must refocus training and mindsets to the long-term view inherent in strategic 
operations in support of national policy.  This refocus must take place in the 
context of national and military political realities:  current national security policy 
and military infighting over roles and functions, and future budgetary constraints.   
x  ARSOF units have a role in all of these 
priorities, but particularly in the ‘prevent and deter conflict’ role.  As the ‘prevail in 
today’s wars’ priority begins to decline, one can assume a comparable decline in 
ARSOF requirements.  The ARSOF units freed from this priority can reassume 
their intended roles in Phase 0 operations—namely, preventing the next decisive 
engagement by building the capacity of our allies and disrupting, defeating, and 
deterring current and future enemies.  These operations will take place in regions 
of political and social unrest that affect the interests of the US and our allies.  
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This renewed focus on Phase 0 operations, will take the form of increased 
bilateral military exchanges in support of the Theater Security Cooperation Plans 
as well as MISO and CA support to country teams’ long-range development 
plans.   
 An additional factor affecting the need for ARSOF to adapt is the shrinking 
of the capability gap between SOF units and GPF units who are becoming ‘more 
SOF-like.’  Many transformations in GPF have allowed them to take on missions 
usually considered the exclusive domain of ARSOF, and ARSOF must redefine 
its capabilities to remain relevant.xi
 Military innovation and adaptation does not occur in a vacuum, and the 
current fiscal situation in the US means that ARSOF decision-makers must argue 
every recommendation in budgetary terms.  President Dwight Eisenhower once 
said, “the patriot today is the fellow who can do the job with less money.”
  GPF units are currently involved in the 
training of both Iraqi and Afghan Army units—the type of FID operation that once 
was the exclusive domain of Army SF.  In addition, as GPF commanders have 
realized the power of information operations, the use of tactics to influence 
popular perceptions have become a component of all military operations—no 
longer the sole purview of psychological operations specialists.  Instead of trying 
to protect ARSOF’s role as the ‘primary capability’ in FID and influence 
operations, leaders should define the strategic and politically-sensitive operations 
which ARSOF is uniquely suited to conduct and use the GPF capabilities to 
compliment them at the tactical and operational levels.  The GPF have a history 
of advisory and stabilization experience—from post-World War II, through Korea, 
to Vietnam—and the future security environment will provide enough work in 
developing nations to occupy the full range of US military capabilities.     
xii  
ARSOF leaders must be these patriots.  Fortunately, budgetary constraints are 
an area where ARSOF has a strong argument for prominence and growth.  
Personnel costs are the largest portion of the DoD budget,xiii and SOF units are 
inherently smaller organizations than GPF.  Although the development and 
sustainment costs for an individual ARSOF soldier is higher than a GPF soldier, 
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the comparative personnel numbers of ARSOF units are lower.  Also, training 
and equipping is only a small portion of personnel cost, the largest portion is in 
healthcare and retirement—areas where there is no distinction between ARSOF 
and GPF individuals.  In addition, the ARSOF focus on exceptionally enabled 
individuals and units, which places priority on training the human platform over 
purchasing expensive technological platforms,xiv will yield a greater return on 
investment than equipment that has a finite life cycle.  Finally in the personnel 
vein, ARSOF has seen rapid growth in the last four years, especially in the 
indirect action forces of SF, CA, and MISO.  These personnel increases are 
already allocated and paid for, so the cost associated with their repurposing is 
minimal compared to having to create military structure.  The argument for force 
structure in the future becomes one of capabilities as compared to cost, as 
Defense Secretary Gates notes, “an effective, affordable, and sustainable U.S. 
defense posture requires a broad portfolio of military capabilities.”xv
 
  Therefore, in 
a future defined by maintaining the maximum capability at the lowest cost, 
ARSOF presents decision-makers with a great return on their investment—high-
capacity forces with low personnel numbers that are, by design, capable of 
strategic impact.  
 Although it is difficult to forecast the future security environment, some 
effort at prediction is necessary in order to prevent any major bureaucracy from 
becoming irrelevant.  Using the military axiom that intelligence drives operations, 
this paper uses the Global Trends 2025 document, produced by the National 
Intelligence Council and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as a 
‘crystal ball.’  Several of the predictions made in the Global Trends report have 
significant impact on the military, and specifically ARSOF.  China and India will 
continue to rise in power, along with non-state actors such as businesses, 
religious organizations, and super-powered individuals, resulting in a redefined 
international system.  Additionally, the increasing diffusion of technology will 
make terrorists groups and rogue states more dangerous as they potentially 
The Distant Future (15+ Years) 
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acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.xvi  The overall tone of the Global 
Trends report, as well as the writings of other military and diplomatic strategists 
suggests that a confrontation with the rising powers of China or India is unlikely, 
but that the US will remain engaged in regional conflicts in developing parts of 
the world, and under threat from terrorist organizations. xvii
 The future security environment will be rife with continuing regional 
conflicts as traditional societies in the developing world collide with the effects of 
globalization. When the US is no longer the dominant global power, the nation 
will no longer have the latitude to conduct unilateral conventional military 
operations in regional conflicts.  Military intervention will either take the form of 
coalition operations with regional and/or other global powers, or will require 
small-scale operations.  As language and culturally trained and attuned soldiers, 
operating in small autonomous units, ARSOF is uniquely suited for both coalition 
and small-scale operations in developing nations.  In addition, the diffusing 
technologies associated with WMDs will place preeminence on not only surgical, 
counter-proliferation direct action capabilities, but also on a global human 
intelligence network that can stop these technologies from getting into the wrong 
hands.  The threats of the future validate the need for capabilities ARSOF 
currently possesses.  However, most of these threats call for an architecture that 
places priority on indirect operations—operating by, with, and through local 
security forces—over the direct action missions, which currently occupy a 
majority of SOF structure and budget.  Therefore, this paper proposes the 
following top-down changes to meet this future threat.   
  These strategic 
predictions place priority on forces that are able to operate independently in 
developing nations, with indigenous counterparts, in order to build their capacity 
to handle their own problems.  This is the very mission set for which ARSOF was 
created.   
 The United States Special Operations Command should be divided into 
two directorates—the indirect action and direct action directorates. In the 
foreseeable future, Army SF, CA, and MISO, could feasibly join with the forces of 
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Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), to form the core of SOCOM’s 
indirect action (IA) directorate.xviii  
  In conjunction with the creation of the IA directorate, Army Special Forces 
should remove direct action from its core tasks.  Direct action operations are 
performed to a higher capability by other SOF units and to an acceptable 
capacity by most US military ground forces—they are not what make Special 
Forces ‘special.’  Instead, the ability to conduct unconventional warfare—the 
guerilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion involved in supporting an insurgency 
against an enemy government—is what makes Special Forces unique.  While 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is often considered ‘the other side of UW,’ it 
should remain a secondary task for Army SF.  Marine Special Operations are 
uniquely suited, and have a culture better attuned to conducting FID.  This should 
remain the primary mission of MARSOC.  Army Civil Affairs and Military 
This directorate would be separate from the 
direct action capabilities, such as Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, and special 
mission direct action units.  The transformation to joint doctrine and training in the 
IA directorate would shift this organization towards the global scouts program. 
This program would place SOF operators—often individuals or small teams—in 
key developing countries where there are US interests.  Personnel would retain 
their functional specialty and become experts in the area to which they are 
assigned.  IA teams would assist the country team and the intelligence 
community by providing ground-level human intelligence.  This capability is not 
currently the focus of either Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or defense attaché 
personnel assigned to embassies.  Furthermore, the IA directorate should 
strengthen ties with both the CIA and Department of State to nest its operations 
in the country plans of State and the requirements of the intelligence community.  
Additionally, the IA directorate would need an innovative personnel management 
system, mirroring the specialization of Foreign Service Officers and CIA Case 
Officers.  In this way, IA personnel, truly become the ‘global scouts’ that they 
claim; providing not only ground-level human intelligence, but also strategic 
reconnaissance for future unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal 
defense (FID) operations. 
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Information Support Operations should continue to do their core missions, but 
with a radical shift in timing—from ‘picking up the pieces’ in the aftermath of large 
conventional campaigns to conducting operations in support of Phase 0, long 
before conflict occurs. 
 Some will argue that the separation of SOCOM into direct and indirect 
directorates will further stovepipe an already divided organization.  While there is 
merit to the argument that both direct and indirect actions should be intertwined, 
the functional stovepipes already exist within the current organizational structure.  
Formalization of this de facto split has more advantages than disadvantages.  
This split will refocus ARSOF on its core tasks, and prevents the trend of SF 
focusing too heavily on direct action missions and CA and MISO focusing at the 
tactical level of operations only.  Finally, the formation of directorates creates the 
synergistic effect of grouping units with similar focus, so that doctrine and training 
can be aligned to truly move towards joint operations—whether direct or indirect 
in nature.  In this proposal, SOCOM facilitates the interagency cooperation so 
integral to both direct and indirect operations. 
 Army Special Operations Forces are at a unique point in their history.  
They currently occupy a position of distinction within the military that they have 
not previously enjoyed.  While some may argue that this is a period to just enjoy 
the new-found acceptance of ARSOF, this would be a missed opportunity.  In a 
future security environment defined by a globalizing international system, 
diffusion of dangerous technologies, constrained budgets, and general purpose 
forces closing the capability gap with ARSOF, this is precisely the time to 
develop a long-range plan for ARSOF transformation.  Change begins with the 
drawdown of ARSOF in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the repurposing of these 
forces to their traditional roles—conducting Phase 0 operations worldwide.  
However, the future security environment demands more than a ‘return to the 
basics’—it will demand ARSOF units that are adaptable, flexible, and always on 
the cutting edge of technological and doctrinal changes.  In order to fully 
maximize their capability and facilitate the strategic impact for which ARSOF was 
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created, the bureaucratic structure above ARSOF units must be drastically 
reshaped.  If this return to core competencies and adaptation of organizational 
structure is done properly, ARSOF will prove that successful prosecution of 
indirect action can prevent the need for direct action and large-scale conflicts.  
 
Major Ben Taylor is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer.  He submitted this paper while 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is currently studying to earn his 
Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. He would like to thank LTC Michael Richardson, 
Military Faculty, NPS, for his help in editing the paper. 
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